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Remarks for the Opening Session of the 
Beijing International Conference on the 
Protection of Children's Rightst 
Sanford]. Fox* 
The matters I would like to address briefly at this opening 
session concern the general nature of children's rights and what 
might be the future effects on children and on society at large of 
our attention to children's rights. To many people the idea of 
children having rights is mildly nonsensical. For those of us who 
take the idea seriously, there is need to clarify what that means 
to us before we engage in detailed discussion and analysis of 
particular rights in particular places at particular times. 
In order to proceed, I must first disclose a basic assumption I 
am making concerning our attitude toward children. It seems 
clear from the history of childhood that concern for the welfare 
of children is one of the themes that appears with some consis-
tency through the centuries. Child abuse, however, is not a new 
phenomenon. In the very recent past many social historians be-
lieved that maltreatment of children was the dominant and per-
vasive way that adults had historically related to children. There 
now seems to be a more balanced view which acknowledges the 
historical existence of child abuse in much the same way that the 
headlines in our newspapers today force us to acknowledge that 
abuse still goes on. I take it, however, that historical opinion also 
confirms our experience of everyday life-that most adults, es-
pecially parents, generally have tried to make children happy, 
healthy, strong, and protected from the hazards of the world. 
The nature and magnitude of these hazards and the ability of 
concerned adults to provide the wished-for protection of children 
t This paper is an adaptation of the text of remarks that were to be delivered at the 
International Conference on the Protection of Children's Rights, jointly sponsored by 
Boston College and the China Law Society. The conference was to be held in Beijing, 
People's Republic of China June 20-24, 1989. On June 5, 1989 Boston College withdrew 
its sponsorship, and the conference has been indefinitely postponed. 
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have all fluctuated widely over time, but I make the assumption 
that there is little new in our effort to embrace a general concern 
for the welfare of children. 
In the context of that assumption, it seems important to think 
about why we now speak of children's rights in addition to or 
instead of the traditional subjects of child welfare and child pro-
tection. Are we repeating the view of our ancestors that children 
are our hope and our future, that they deserve our care because 
in so many ways they cannot care for themselves? Perhaps there 
is really no difference between a policy of child welfare and the 
concept of children's rights. If that is the case then our concen-
tration on children's rights only illustrates that there is a fashion 
or fad in semantics, as in other things, and that it is now fashion-
able to express our traditional concerns about children in terms 
of their rights. But that is not the only interpretation for a con-
ference on children's rights. It may be that our language of rights 
reflects that we are, in fact, committed to something new about 
children, something that can be distinguished from child welfare. 
I am myself strongly inclined to believe that the rights of children 
are not merely a way of expressing traditional child welfare pol-
icies, and I hope to use my time before you to outline some of 
the reasons for holding this belief and to propose a particular 
conception of children's rights. 
I would also like to suggest that the question of precisely which 
rights children should have is intimately connected to the matter 
of why we speak about the rights of children and that we cannot 
discuss either of these questions without at least making assump-
tions about the other. 
The question of what we mean by children's rights has three 
central requirements. The first requires that in dealing with the 
question of why we now discuss the rights of children, we must 
be careful to avoid thinking that the question is somehow peculiar 
to children. Of course it is not. All parts of our planet, East, West, 
North, and South, have been occupied by discussions of rights, 
including human rights, minority rights, women's rights, patients' 
rights, people's rights, and the rights of indigenous populations. 
Some parts of the world are even confronting challenges in the 
form of animal rights. To a large extent, therefore, our question 
is, why is use of the term rights now so broadly popular? 
The second requirement is historical in nature. It compels us 
to acknowledge that, at least in Western civilization, the impor-
tance of rights is not something our own generation has invented. 
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One of the things that contributed to holding the Roman Empire 
together, for example, was the grant of citizenship rights to many 
whom the Romans had conquered. Similarly, it would be fair to 
say that in Western Europe the society of the Middle Ages was 
structured, at least in part, on a complex relationship of rights 
between individuals and classes. 
The third requirement is in the nature of a sense of proportion. 
Specifically, it seems that an emphasis on the rights of children, 
rather than on their protection and welfare, is still much less than 
pervasive. For example, a joint resolution currently before the 
Congress of the United States stresses the importance of chil-
dren's health but makes no reference at all to a child's right to 
health. More importantly, even where the matter of rights is 
central as it is in the Convention on the Rights of the Child,l the 
human rights treaty that is one of the themes of this conference, 
the focus is largely on rights to protection and welfare. Civil and 
political rights are only modestly protected, and rights connected 
to making decisions for one's self, or autonomy rights, are almost 
entirely absent. 
The fact that emphasis on children's rights is part of a wider 
emphasis on rights, and recognition that the matter of rights has 
long been a part of at least Western social history both contribute 
to our understanding of the nature of children's rights. Together 
they suggest that children's rights are different from child wel-
fare. They also suggest that there is indeed something new about 
the subject of our conference. This newness has to do with the 
basic rationale for the current focus on rights and with the ease 
with which we can see a place for children in that rationale. Its 
essence is linkage of children with certain other groups in society, 
groups which have been perceptively identified by one American 
writer, Professor David Trubeck. Looking at one of the historic 
functions of rights, Professor Trubeck notes: 
The recognition of the importance of rights as a weapon 
against power and privilege has been the impetus of a long 
struggle in Western capitalist nations through which workers 
and others outside the status and property elites have sought 
to protect their welfare. 2 
I Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. Doc. E/CN .4/29 (1989). 
2 Trubeck, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in the Third World: Human Rights Law and 
Human Needs Programs, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 250, 229 (T. Meron, 
ed. 1985). 
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Here we are asked to recognize that the strong and powerful 
have seldom needed rights to advance their welfare. Trubeck 
suggests that in contrast, the welfare of the weak and vulnerable 
has urgently needed the weapon of rights. The truth of this 
observation is easily recognized. We can, for example, readily 
identify the struggle for civil rights in the United States, the quest 
for gender equality in much of the world, and the quest for self-
determination of colonized people as fitting into this conception 
of rights as a weapon against power and privilege. Rights as a 
means for advancing the welfare of the powerless has become a 
near-universal concern that is not limited to Western capitalist 
nations. 
Children are probably the quintessential example of the weak 
and the vulnerable; and it is, therefore, no surprise that they are 
now to be counted among those for whom this weapon of rights 
is becoming available. But it is the analysis of why rights are 
considered a powerful weapon that gets us closer to understand-
ing the nature of children's rights. 
Rights have the power to compel. If they are legal rights then 
the law and the legal system compel their respect. A legal system 
that compels respect may be a system of national law, or it may 
be the international legal order. In the case of the rights protected 
by the Convention on the Rights of the Child,3 the compulsion 
comes from both domestic and international law. If moral rights 
are in question, then the principles of a system of morality require 
respect for such rights. When someone has a right, he or she 
need offer no justification for its exercise. If a woman is denied 
employment on account of her gender, she need not explain why 
discrimination is wrong; she can simply claim the equality to 
which her rights entitle her. Conversely, no proof by the employer 
that discrimination would in some sense be a good thing in this 
case can deny her claim. 
Rights in this sense are demands to be sharply distinguished 
from requests. They are demands that cannot be resisted. The 
government has a right to require military service and payment 
of taxes from its citizens. The summons to the army and the bill 
from the tax collector are not requests to serve if you have nothing 
else to do or to pay if you think you can afford it. Similarly, if a 
child has a right to something, he or she can demand that thing 
3 Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. Doc. E/CN .4/29 (1989). 
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and need not merely request it or beg someone to provide it. To 
have rights in this sense is to be taken out of the class of persons 
commonly called beggars and those who depend on the mercy 
of others for their welfare. The Convention on the Rights of the 
Child4 represents a consensus in the international community that 
children are entitled to demand, not request, qTtain things from 
their own governments. 
The relationship between children's rights and child welfare 
can now be identified. The power of children to compel advance-
ment of their welfare by the assertion of rights is an essential 
component of child welfare. 
At this point, the question arises as to whether we really want 
to include children's rights in our child welfare policies. Does it 
make sense to empower children to make the irresistible demands 
that are implied by their having rights? Before jumping to an 
answer, we need to acknowledge that in recognizing children's 
rights we are committing ourselves to satisfying the demands 
encompassed by those rights. Since to assert a right is to present 
a demand that cannot be resisted, we who have power over chil-
dren, whether we be parents, private citizens, or governments, 
must accept that our power is eroded by the arrival of children's 
rights. To expand the power of children is also to shift power 
from the presently powerful, such as governments and parents, 
to the powerless, such as children. But this is generally true about 
the creation of rights and is highlighted as to human rights by 
developments in international law from the United Nations 
Charter in 1946 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights5 
in 1948 leading directly to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child6 that will be placed before the General Assembly in 1989. 
The widespread acceptance of a world heavily dominated by 
rights pivotally rests on the conception of what the world would 
be like without rights. It would be one in which we could make 
no demands on each other and only requests to which no one 
was obliged to respond. Each of us, because we cannot be totally 
self-sufficient, would depend for the satisfaction of our needs on 
the goodwill of others, on how they defined this goodwill, and 
whether they chose to exercise it. Some might see such a society 
4Id. 
S Universal Declaration of Human Rights. G.A. Res. 217 A(lII), U.N. Doc. A/811, at 
art. 13 (1948). 
6 Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. Doc. E/CN .4/29 (1989). 
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as a utopia. For most people, however, such a world is firmly 
rejected, in part because the goodwill, mercy, and benevolence 
that would be necessary to get on with life are not guaranteed to 
be present in all people, nor in any particular people all the time. 
As well, there is not sufficient agreement on what these ideals 
imply in terms of care for others. But more fundamental than 
the fact that we are not all saints and martyrs is the fear of living 
in a dismal society of beggars where no one possesses the human 
dignity that accompanies the entitlement to have basic needs 
satisfied and personality respected, a society where no one, in 
other words, has rights. 
This same rationale supports children's rights. Without them, 
children are dependent on a supply of kindness and concern that 
both past and present demonstrate is too often in short supply. 
They must be entitled to demand things from us, and we must 
be required to respond. If, in the process, we lose some of our 
power, surely we and they gain by introducing our world's chil-
dren to the experience of human dignity in the justified expec-
tation that their experience will strengthen their capacity to re-
spect the dignity of others. 
In closing, it is worth emphasizing and reiterating that there is 
an international consensus that the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child and its cousins in international human rights law rep-
resent erosions of the power of governments and provide weap-
ons for children to use to advance their welfare, in many cases 
against their own governments. This consensus recognizes that 
not even governments or political parties, (some would say "es-
pecially not"), always embody the mercy and wisdom required by 
children. 
This international consensus grows measurably and signifi-
cantly more influential from the fact that the international move-
ment to achieve children's rights now has a strong Chinese voice 
within it that is expressed by this conference taking place today 
in Beijing. 
